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 The Implementation Process of Comparable
 Worth: Winners and Losers
 Peter F. Orazem and J. Peter Mattila
 Iowa State University
 This paper provides a unique opportunity to observe how a public
 policy affected the earnings of various interest groups at different
 stages of implementation. Specifically, we examine how the earnings
 of women, union members, and supervisory and professional staff
 were affected by various proposed and implemented comparable
 worth pay plans in Iowa. We find that large relative gains to women
 in the original proposed plans were reduced as the process evolved.
 As a result, some of the original gains to women were redistributed
 to union members, supervisors, and professionals.
 Despite 25 years of legislation related to equal pay, equal opportunity,
 and affirmative action for women in the job market, women still tend
 to be concentrated in relatively low-paying, predominantly female
 jobs. This perceived lack of rapid progress in women's labor market
 status has motivated some states and localities to consider or imple-
 ment comparable worth as an additional weapon in the battle against
 sex discrimination. Supporters view comparable worth as a method
 for achieving immediate increases in the pay for female-dominated
 jobs, given the apparent ineffectiveness of previous legislation in rais-
 ing the pay of women relative to that of men.
 A typical comparable worth policy calls for a study of jobs and pay
 structure within an organization to determine if there has been any
 We would like to thank the Panel on Pay Equity, National Research Council, for
 partial support in funding this study and members of the state government of Iowa for
 their cooperation in providing data and information relevant to the comparable worth
 process. Jeff Greig and Kyle Stephens provided able research assistance. The views
 expressed in this paper are exclusively those of the authors.
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 sex bias in compensation and, if so, to correct the situation. Jobs are
 usually analyzed in terms of the skills, effort, responsibility, and work-
 ing conditions required. Typically, points will be assigned to each job
 attribute so that a weighted total number of points can ultimately be
 associated with each job. Job classifications having equal (or near
 equal) total points are assigned equal wage rates. Comparable worth
 proposals typically ignore market wages in setting relative pay be-
 cause market wages are presumed to embed discrimination against
 predominantly female jobs. Advocates argue that use of the job analy-
 sis/factor point method will eliminate sex bias in the pay plan.
 A fundamental problem with such plans is that the valuation of
 different jobs is inherently subjective, meaning that two equally in-
 formed, unbiased, and qualified analysts could value the same job
 very differently. The problem becomes more difficult as more and
 more agents with differing agendas are brought into the analysis.
 Because comparable worth pay analysis in the public sector has typi-
 cally been conducted with input from various combinations of consul-
 tants, politicians, women's groups, union representatives, supervisory
 staff, and rank-and-file employees, it is clear that the results can be
 influenced by the objectives of the individuals or constituent groups
 involved in the process. The process becomes even more subject to
 external pressure when decisions are made regarding implementa-
 tion of the plan. Public-sector budget constraints, market opportuni-
 ties for public-sector employees, and union resistance to pay cuts may
 significantly alter the pay plan relative to the initial proposal.
 This paper illustrates how the original goals of a comparable worth
 policy can become diluted as political and economic pressures from
 state budgets, politicians, unions, personnel professionals, market
 forces, and supervisory personnel enter the implementation process.
 We make use of a unique data set from the state of Iowa that allows us
 to examine the earnings structure underlying the initial pay plan, a
 consultant's initial proposed plan, a plan designed by a steering com-
 mittee composed of politicians, a compromise plan implemented after
 negotiations between the state and the union, and the final plan that
 resulted after an appeals process was completed. We are able to show
 how the returns to women, union members, supervisors, and profes-
 sionals changed under successive pay plans. The results indicate that
 initial gains to women were ultimately reduced and redirected toward
 constituencies that stood to lose or gain little as a result of the initial
 plan: union members, professionals, supervisors, and those with the
 highest market wages.
 In the next section, we discuss the process of legislating and imple-
 menting comparable worth in the state of Iowa. After a discussion of
 our data and methodology, we present our empirical analysis. We
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 conclude with a summary of our results and an evaluation of whether
 these results are likely to generalize to other states.
 Comparable Worth in Iowa
 To date in the United States, comparable worth legislation has been
 directed only toward government employees at the state or local level.
 A recent law in Ontario, Canada, extended coverage to private-sector
 firms as well. At least seven states completed or have begun to imple-
 ment comparable worth pay adjustments (Connecticut, Iowa, Min-
 nesota, New York, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin), at least two
 states have completed studies and are deciding whether to implement
 pay adjustments (Michigan and New Jersey), and several other states
 are in the process of studying or are considering a study of pay in-
 equities.' In addition, a large number of municipal, county, and
 school district governing units have initiated comparable worth stud-
 ies or plans (Ehrenberg and Smith 1987).
 This study focuses on the implementation of comparable worth
 plans in Iowa. This process started in 1983 when the Iowa legislature
 voted to fund an initial study of the Iowa Merit Pay System by consul-
 tant Arthur Young and Company. A steering committee composed of
 legislators, administrators, and union representatives voted not to use
 market wage survey data in the analysis. In cooperation with the
 consultant, 13 factors (discussed in more detail below) that measured
 various aspects of skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions
 were defined. Four-person teams of employees and supervisors as-
 signed points to each factor for each job to which they were assigned.
 The teams based their evaluations on employee questionnaires.
 Factor weights were obtained using two different methods. First,
 the Arthur Young consultants derived statistical weights based on the
 estimated coefficients computed by regressing pay grade on each of
 the 13 job factors plus a variable that controlled for the percentage
 female in each job. These estimated weights included several that
 were statistically insignificant and three that had small negative values.
 After examining these regression weights, the steering committee
 defined a second set, which we refer to as the committee weights.
 1 Several states in recent years have developed new state pay plans using factor point-
 count methods but have also incorporated market wage survey information in setting
 wage rates for key jobs. Although these state plans (such as in Idaho, Louisiana, Massa-
 chusetts, New Mexico, Ohio, and Tennessee) have many features that are similar to
 comparable worth, they deviate to the extent that market wage rates alter relative pay.
 The state of Washington also utilized market wage survey information, but we include
 it in our list of comparable worth states since it has been widely publicized as such and,
 in particular, because the unions had to sue to obtain implementation of the state's
 original intent to make such adjustments.
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 These subjective weights differed in that all were assigned positive
 values and no factor was given a weight below 5 percent or above 15
 percent of the total.
 Two sets of total job points (and hence pay grade plans) were gen-
 erated, one for each set of factor weights. Each recommended plan
 would have decreased the pay of some job classifications while in-
 creasing the pay of other classifications, thereby helping to limit the
 cost of implementation. The unions, which had been highly suppor-
 tive up to this point, became resistant when pay cuts became a possi-
 bility. From the state's perspective, elimination of the pay cuts would
 have raised the cost of implementation to an unacceptable level.
 These issues became part of the contract negotiations between the
 state and the unions in 1984. The compromise plan settlement was
 that no one suffer a reduction in pay grade and that the size of all
 increases be reduced by one pay grade and one step. This plan was
 implemented (and extended by the governor to noncontract employ-
 ees) in March 1985.
 After implementation, an appeals process was put into effect to
 hear complaints concerning the comparable worth adjustments. Non-
 union appeals were heard by a panel of five personnel professionals,
 while union appeals were heard by a joint union-management panel.
 Forty-five percent of the merit system pay recommendations were
 appealed, with roughly equal proportions receiving increases, de-
 creases, and no change on appeal. The final settlement of a new
 round of union contract negotiations provided implementation of the
 recommended pay increase in full in July 1987 but canceled all rec-
 ommended pay cuts. We estimate that, in total, the final comparable
 worth system increased annual state payrolls by $26.2 million in 1983
 dollars or 8.8 percent of the original payroll.
 Methodology and Data
 Our objective is to isolate the effect of alternative comparable worth
 pay plans on the structure of earnings. To do this, we must not allow
 other factors to change that would also alter the pay structure. It
 would be inaccurate, for example, to compare earnings functions
 estimated over samples of workers employed before implementation
 and after implementation. Because the new pay system may cause
 some employees to quit, others to transfer to different jobs, and still
 others to enter state employment, such comparisons of snapshots of
 the state pay structure at different points in time will be subject to
 sample selection bias. Second, changes in other exogenous influences
 over time such as political elections, shifts in public demand for gov-
 ernment services, or changes in government revenue could also alter
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 the pay structure. Such coincident influences on employee earnings
 would render difficult any derivation of the comparative static effects
 of comparable worth. Finally, our objective is to illustrate how the
 proposed structure of earnings evolved over time. But not all pro-
 posed plans were implemented. Thus we require a methodology that
 allows us to analyze both earnings structures that were implemented
 and those that were never adopted.
 We resolve these potential problems by holding constant a Decem-
 ber 1983 sample of state employees and then observing how their pay
 would have changed (in 1983 dollars) as a result of each of the pro-
 posed or implemented comparable worth plans discussed above. That
 is, given an individual's 1983 job classification and pay grade, we are
 able to compute the number of pay grades that his or her job would
 have increased or decreased given each comparable worth proposal.
 Using the December 1983 pay schedule, we then compute what an
 individual's pay would have been in each case. We compute five dif-
 ferent earnings rates for each employee: (1) the actual 1983 earnings,
 (2) the earnings associated with the recommended Arthur Young
 plan using the statistical weights, (3) the earnings associated with the
 recommended steering committee plan using the committee weights,
 (4) the earnings rate associated with the implemented state/American
 Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME)
 compromise plan, and (5) the earnings rate associated with the imple-
 mented state/AFSCME appeals plan. We are therefore able to analyze
 all plans, whether implemented or not, avoiding biases associated with
 sample selection or coincident changes in exogenous variables other
 than comparable worth.
 We use the standard earnings function approach pioneered by
 Mincer (1974) to relate earnings to a set of human capital and individ-
 ual characteristics according to
 In Wik ak + bkS1 + CkUz + dkPi + ek In MWi + fkX1 + E k, (1)
 where In Wik is the natural logarithm of individual i's biweekly earn-
 ings under pay plan k, S, is a dummy variable that takes the value of
 one if the incumbent is female, U, is a vector of union status variables,
 Pi represents dummy variables for professional and supervisory posi-
 tions, ln MWi is the natural logarithm of the median market wage for
 the occupation, and Xi is a vector of other human capital and personal
 characteristics commonly used in earnings functions. These variables
 are defined more precisely below. The parameters ak, bk, Ck, dk, ek, and
 fk are specific to pay plan k, and Eik is the error term. These parameters
 may be compared across pay plans to determine how returns to the
 various characteristics change across pay plans.
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 More directly, we could estimate the change in returns across pay
 plans by estimating the equation
 In W^k - In W,0 = (ak - ao) + (bk - bo)St + (Ck - co)U,
 + (dk - do)PI + (ek- eo) In MW, (2)
 + (fk - fO)XI + (Eik -i0),
 where the zero subscript represents the original 1983 pay structure.
 The estimated coefficients in (2) measure the change in the return to
 the various characteristics under pay plan k relative to the original
 1983 pay plan. A positive coefficient implies that the characteristic
 "wins" relative to other characteristics as a result of comparable
 worth, while a negative coefficient means that it "loses." Estimation of
 (1) and (2) will allow us to observe how sex, union status, professional
 and supervisory status, market wages, and other characteristics
 change in importance and value in each successive pay structure.
 Our data set consists of a random sample of 3,734 state government
 employees in Iowa as of December 1983. This was roughly one-fifth
 of total state merit employment.2 Personal characteristics as well as job
 classifications, biweekly pay, supervisory/professional status, union
 contract coverage, union dues checkoff, and employment time with
 the state came from a December 1983 payroll tape. Educational at-
 tainment, licensing, vocational training, military experience, and non-
 state work experience were culled from state personnel record files.
 We used (generally private-sector) wage survey data published by the
 Job Service of Iowa (1984) to measure median occupational market
 wages. We compared job descriptions used in the Job Service survey
 with job descriptions used by the State Merit Employment Depart-
 ment in order to match jobs as closely as possible.
 Each employee's actual biweekly earnings rate during December
 1983 was extracted from the payroll tape. Given the individual's job
 classification, we used tables supplied by Arthur Young and Company
 (1984) (for the statistical and committee plans) and by the state (for
 the 1985 and 1987 plans) to infer how the individual's pay grade
 would have changed under each of the comparable worth plans.
 These pay grades were translated into biweekly earnings rates using
 2 Employees of the state universities and a small number of nonmerit employees (not
 subject to Civil Service exams and procedures) were excluded from the Iowa compara-
 ble worth process.
 3 There is no need to adjust for the value of fringe benefits or for cost-of-living
 differentials since all state employees receive the same benefits and since the vast
 majority of employees live and work in central Iowa, in the Des Moines-Ames met-
 ropolitan area.
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 the December 1983 pay plan tables that were also supplied by the
 state. See Orazem and Mattila (1988) for further details on the data
 set and the measurement of the variables.
 Results
 The Female-Male Pay Gap
 Means and standard deviations of the variables are reported in table
 1. Most of the explanatory variables are binary variables, although
 education, tenure, experience, and years out of the labor force are
 measured in years. The market wage is shown in dollars in table 1,
 although entered in log form in the regressions so that its coefficient
 can be interpreted as an elasticity.
 Summary statistics are also shown separately for men and for
 women, who represented 49.9 percent of the sample.4 In 1983, wom-
 en's earnings averaged 78.7 percent as much as those of men. Each of
 the comparable worth plans would have increased the typical wom-
 en's pay more than men's pay. Indeed, the plan based on the statistical
 weights would have reduced the average men's biweekly pay by
 $22.20 and raised women's pay to 88 percent of the average men's
 pay. However, as a result of implementation and the appeals process,
 no one's pay was cut, and women ended up gaining $68.99 biweekly
 (12.3 percent) while men gained $42.85 biweekly (6.0 percent). As a
 consequence, average female earnings rose to only 83.4 percent of
 average male earnings. Overall, the net effect of comparable worth
 was to increase women's relative pay by less than five percentage
 points.
 At this level of aggregation, it appears that women did gain as a
 result of comparable worth. However, economists tend to be more
 interested in the size of the female-male earnings gap after control-
 ling for human capital and personal characteristics.5 Table 2 provides
 4 In 1983, 47.3 percent of state government employees were female. By comparison,
 42 percent of Iowa private-sector and local-government employees were female, ac-
 cording to 1980 census data.
 5 We exclude the 13 original job factors and the total factor points from the regres-
 sion so as to focus on the pure effect of the personal and human capital variables.
 Variables such as supervisors, education, and experience have corresponding factors
 that compete to explain the same effects. Also, as we argue in this paper, various
 groups such as unions, professionals, and supervisors were able to influence the job
 factors and the factor-weighting process so that factor points are also a function of sex,
 union status, professional status, and supervisory status. Thus, e.g., the full impact of
 union status on the pay structure is the direct impact (through negotiation) and the
 indirect effect through potential influence on factor weights and measurements. For
 tests of the sensitivity of our results to other specifications, see Orazem and Mattila
 (1989).
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 TABLE 3
 RATIO OF FEMALE TO MALE EARNINGS
 Arthur Arthur
 Young Young 1985 1987
 1983 Statistical Committee Compromise Appeal
 Uncorrected .787 .880 .870 .829 .834
 Corrected (including
 market wage)* .951 1.009 .996 .964 .971
 Corrected (excluding
 market wage)* .877 .986 .957 .913 .916
 Corrected (as directly
 implied by table 2) .961 1.049 .989 .968 .975
 * The ratio is computed as the average female wage divided by the predicted female wage under the male
 earnings structure. The latter was computed by first estimating eq. (1) over the sample of male incumbents for each
 plan, including and excluding the market wage, respectively. These coefficients represent the male earnings struc-
 ture. The summation of the average female characteristics multiplied by their respective coefficients from the male
 earnings structure is a commonly used estimate of what women would earn if their characteristics were rewarded at
 the same rate as men.
 regression estimates of equation (1) in which we control for standard
 measures of education, training, work experience, marital status, and
 race, as well as the market wage. After controlling for these variables,
 we see in column 1 that women were underpaid by only 3.9 percent
 relative to men in 1983. This coefficient is sensitive to inclusion of the
 market wage variable. When equation (1) is reestimated excluding the
 market wage, women earned 12 percent less than men.
 For our purposes, what is more important is how returns to women
 change from one pay plan to the next, not the magnitude of the
 differential. In table 3, we report the estimated ratio of female to male
 wages both controlling and not controlling for market wages. The
 highest relative female earnings occur in the statistical plan. However,
 later revisions and compromises tended to dissipate these gains for
 women. This general pattern of reductions in the relative gains to
 women is not altered by the inclusion or exclusion of market wages.
 Overall, the results suggest that the implemented plan reduced the
 unexplained pay gap between men and women by 32-40 percent,
 whereas the original proposed statistical plan would have virtually
 eliminated the pay gap.
 The Arthur Young Statistical Weight Plan
 The original proposed pay plan devised by the Arthur Young consul-
 tants weighted the job factors on the basis of coefficients derived from
 a regression of pay grades on measured job characteristics. Of the
 four comparable worth plans that we consider, this plan was least
 subject to political forces. Although based on the same 13 job factors
 as the other plans, its weights were determined in a "scientific" man-
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 ner. The statistical plan proposed cutting pay for some jobs while
 raising pay for others.
 The impact of the statistical plan may be analyzed either by com-
 paring columns 1 and 2 of table 2 or directly by focusing on the pay
 difference coefficients of column 6. In either case, women would have
 enjoyed a substantial 8.8-percentage-point gain in pay on average.
 Women having started 3.9 percent behind men under the 1983 pay
 plan, the statistical plan would have given women a 4.9 percent ad-
 vantage over men, other things constant.
 It is notable that the earnings of unionized workers would have
 deteriorated. Those covered by a union contract would have lost 3.8
 percentage points in pay. Those who were dues-paying members
 (with professional associations excluded) would have lost an addi-
 tional 4.8 percent in pay, for a total loss of 8.6 percent. One might
 have expected these effects if unions were disproportionately male.
 However, referring back to table 1, we see that men and women were
 almost equally likely to be covered by a union contract. On the other
 hand, men were somewhat more likely to be dues-paying members of
 unions than women were, while equal proportions of each sex paid
 dues to a professional association.
 Men are more likely to be professionals and supervisors than
 women are. As seen in table 2, professional employees would have
 lost 1.9 percent of earnings, other things constant, under the statisti-
 cal plan. Supervisors would have neither gained nor lost any earnings
 as indicated by the statistically insignificant coefficient for pay differ-
 entials.
 The Committee Weights Plan
 On receiving the consultants' proposed plan, the steering committee
 devised its own set of weights. Job factors such as physical demands,
 working environment, mental/visual demands, unavoidable hazards/
 risks, and work pace/pressures and interruptions that had negative or
 near-zero coefficients in the statistical plan were given positive
 weights. To the extent that these characteristics were closely associ-
 ated with blue-collar and clerical jobs, this could be expected to raise
 the pay of many workers covered by union contract. In fact, the
 committee explicitly took into account how the factor weights influ-
 enced outcomes, including how they affected relative pay for female
 jobs, in revising the factor weights.6 By setting the weights partly on
 6 The Arthur Young report (1984, p. 30) states that "upon reviewing the results of
 the statistical analysis, the committee determined that the preliminary weights again
 needed to be refined. The Steering Committee established, as their policy, a final set of
 weights for each factor. In making their determination they considered the different
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 the basis of their impacts on outcomes, the committee allowed the
 possibility that favoritism toward a constituency could enter the pay
 plan.
 As seen in table 2, for whatever reasons, the losses that would have
 been inflicted on unionized workers under the statistical plan were
 eliminated under the committee plan. The pay difference coefficients
 (col. 7) show that unionized workers would have made small positive,
 although insignificant, gains under the committee plan relative to the
 original 1983 pay plan. At a minimum, the committee plan was neu-
 tral toward union jobs.7
 In the original Arthur Young study, the job factor most closely
 associated with supervision (supervision exercised) had a regression
 coefficient that was essentially equal to the regression coefficients for
 two other factors (impact of errors and guidelines/supervision avail-
 able to the workers). The committee plan assigned an 8 percent
 weight to supervision exercised while leaving the other two factors
 with 5 percent weights. The committee plan raised supervisors' pay by
 3.7 percent relative to the 1983 pay plan. This plan also restored
 professionals' pay to its original relative level, eliminating a 1.9 per-
 cent cut in the statistical plan.
 Although it may not have been the committee's objective, the net
 result of these changes was to greatly reduce the relative gains for
 women. As opposed to the 8.8 percent gain under the statistical plan,
 women would have gained only 2.8 percent relative to 1983 pay
 schedules under the committee plan. One way of interpreting this is
 that the committee plan shifted the gains toward unions, supervisors,
 and professionals and away from women. Of course, we should keep
 in mind that the regression results highlight the relative gains with
 other variables held constant. In fact, the committee plan raised aver-
 age pay for both men and women (as seen in table 1). In other words,
 the committee plan achieved less equalization of pay between men
 and women than the statistical plan, but at a much higher total cost to
 the state.
 The 1985 Compromise Plan
 Neither of these plans was ever implemented. Instead the state and
 AFSCME negotiated a compromise pay plan. The major compromise
 impacts on male and female jobs, . . . the statistically derived weights for predicting
 current grade levels, and the ways the factors actually acted in determining the final
 point totals for all jobs."
 7 Even though the committee plan increased average pay, it reduced the standard
 deviation of pay across all jobs. This pattern is also typical of the impact of unions on
 income distributions. See Freeman and Medoff (1984) for a discussion of the effect of
 unions on income inequality.
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 was a reduction in the size of the comparable worth pay increases in
 return for no pay cuts. Both features would be expected to reduce the
 size of the gains to women since female-dominated jobs increased less
 and male-dominated jobs avoided cuts. Our results confirm this: the
 1985 compromise plan increased female earnings by only 0.7 percent-
 age points relative to the 1983 plan. Women did gain relative to men,
 but only by a small fraction of the potential gains that would have
 been made had either of the earlier proposals been implemented.
 Once again, this should be interpreted in a relative sense. As seen in
 table 1, in absolute terms, average female pay increased on implemen-
 tation more than it would have under the statistical plan but increased
 less than under the committee plan.
 In relative terms, if women gained less, then other interest groups
 must have gained more. Our results in table 2 suggest that unionized
 workers, professionals, and supervisors gained. Those covered by
 union contracts and those paying union dues gained relative to all
 prior plans. Dues-paying workers covered by union contracts enjoyed
 2.5 percent increases in earnings overall. Professionals gained relative
 to all preceding pay plans. It appears that these heavily male job
 classifications may have benefited from the elimination of pay cuts, as
 did unionized workers. Supervisors also gained relative to 1983 and
 to the statistical plan, although not relative to the committee plan.
 The 1987 Appeals Plan
 Of the 798 merit pay job classifications that existed in 1985, 363 were
 appealed. About one-third of the appeals resulted in an increase in
 pay grade. Although 28 percent of the appeals resulted in a proposed
 pay reduction, no reductions were implemented. Therefore, the ap-
 peals plan is the same as the compromise plan except for the imple-
 mented pay increases. In addition to the appeals, a relatively small
 number of high-level job classifications received comparable worth
 increases in 1987 after implementation had been postponed in 1985.
 We were uncertain about what impact the appeals process would
 have. On the one hand, complaints from men and management con-
 cerns about meeting market wages could move the pay plan back
 toward the original 1983 pay structure. On the other hand, com-
 plaints from women and continuing inequities could move it toward
 additional gains for women.
 Our results indicate that, on net, women did make some small
 additional gains as a result of the appeals process. Recall that the 1985
 compromise plan left women with only a 0.7 percent gain relative to
 men. Had the appeals recommendations been implemented in full,
 including pay cuts, we calculate (not shown) that women's gains would
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 have totaled 2.0 percent. However, this was rolled back to a 1.4 per-
 cent gain.
 Unions also gained from the appeals process. Dues-paying mem-
 bers of professional associations enjoyed the largest gain, a total pay
 differential of 7.3 percent. Having union representatives on their
 appeals committees appears to have been useful. There was little
 change in the relative pay of supervisors and professionals.
 Relative Gains or Losses to Other Characteristics
 Although comparable worth plans purport to ignore market wages in
 establishing pay, market forces still influence the pay structure in each
 pay plan. Moreover, the statistical plan, the plan least influenced by
 constituent pressure or compromise, reduced the influence of market
 wages the least. The committee plan, on the other hand, reduced the
 influence of market wages by 57 percent relative to the original 1983
 pay structure. Thereafter, the implemented compromise plan and
 the appeals process reintroduced the influence of market wages. At
 least in Iowa, it appears that market forces did influence the outcome
 of the pay analysis process once it came time to actually implement the
 plan, and again as the appeals process allowed further pay adjust-
 ments over time.
 Another interesting question has been the impact of a comparable
 worth policy on the pay for minorities. Iowa has a disproportionately
 small population of minorities, and state employment reflects that.
 Only 2 percent of our sample is classified as minority (black, Hispanic,
 or American Indian). Nevertheless, the impact of the various plans
 was to reduce relative pay for minorities by 1 percent in all pay sys-
 tems. Both the small population of minorities and the low marginal
 significance level of the coefficients (it is significant at the 10 percent
 level but not the 5 percent level in the implemented plans) suggest
 caution in generalizing this result to other states.
 A final interesting effect of the Iowa comparable worth process was
 the relative treatment of educational degrees relative to additional
 years of education. There appears to be a clear pattern of increasing
 the returns to credentials or threshold levels of education.8 The coef-
 ficients on dummy variables signifying the attainment of master's,
 doctoral, and vocational degrees and occupational licenses are all pos-
 itive and generally significant in the pay differences equations. Recipi-
 ents of Ph.D.'s and holders of occupational licenses made particularly
 8 In other words, there seems to be a shift in relative rewards to education toward the
 type of returns emphasized in the screening literature (Spence 1973).
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 significant relative gains. On the other hand, marginal increases in
 human capital as measured by years of education, years of job tenure
 with the state, and years of job experience prior to entering state
 employment either decreased in relative returns or had no change.
 This relative deemphasis in marginal returns to human capital in-
 vestment accompanied perhaps by an increase in returns to specific
 threshold levels of education is likely to occur in other settings. First,
 because job pay is set in regard to the minimum requirements for
 successful completion of the job, additional education beyond the
 minimum is likely to be deemphasized. Second, because the plans are
 designed to emphasize factors that previously were not being re-
 warded in the pay structure, the factors that had been given impor-
 tance in the original pay plan (including tenure, experience, and edu-
 cation) must fall in relative importance.9
 Conclusions
 Our major conclusion is that the ultimate impact of comparable worth
 on the wage structure of state employees in Iowa was greatly modified
 by various interest groups through the political process of legislation
 and implementation. Potential gains of 8.8 percentage points in fe-
 male pay relative to male pay under the original statistical plan ended
 up as a gain of only 1.4 percentage points once comparable worth was
 fully implemented and appeals were resolved.
 Through a series of modifications to the plan and through collec-
 tive bargaining compromises, other interest groups such as unions,
 supervisors, and professionals were able to avoid potential losses in
 pay that would have accrued under the original statistical plan. In-
 deed, these groups ended up with relative pay increases. Dues-paying
 workers covered by union contracts converted potential relative losses
 of 8.6 percent to actual relative gains of 3.4 percent in earnings.
 Similar though smaller gains were made by professionals and super-
 visors. Regardless whether we interpret this as a defensive reaction to
 protect their incumbents from economic loss (Hirsch and Addison
 1986) or as rent-seeking activity designed to enhance their income
 (Buchanan, Tollison, and Tullock 1980), the net impact was to shift
 gains away from women toward these interest groups. The bottom
 line is that although women gained, they would have gained much
 9 O'Neill, Brien, and Cunningham (1989) report lower returns to education and job
 experience in the Washington State comparable worth plan. In contrast with our re-
 sults, they do not find increases in returns to threshold levels of education.
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 more (given the ultimate state outlay) had the original "formula" not
 been modified.'0
 One may question how general our findings are since our data
 relate to one state and one comparable worth process. A final judg-
 ment must await further research. However, on the basis of our in-
 quiries in other comparable worth states, we find that many of the
 same phenomena are at work." In all states, influential legislators or
 governors played a key role in the early stages along with sympathetic
 high-level managers. Most oversight committees contained super-
 visors, especially from the personnel department, and all contained
 legislators except in New York.
 Consultants were hired in the early stages in all states to analyze pay
 discrimination and to conduct a job factor analysis leading to propos-
 als for change. Although contracts were divided among Arthur
 Young and Company, Hay Associates, Halcrest-Craver, and Willis
 Associates, they all tended to analyze jobs on the basis of skills re-
 quired, effort or major demands, responsibility, and working condi-
 tions and used a point-count method. Then, after examining the
 outcomes, the state typically altered the consultants' proposals. For
 example, in New York, working conditions were deleted, a different
 set of factors was used, and new weights were computed. In Min-
 nesota, New Jersey, and Oregon, additional points or weights were
 added to certain job factors. In Connecticut, the appropriate points
 were negotiated with each of several unions. All states ignored market
 wages in making comparisons between male and female jobs (except
 Washington, as discussed in n. 1).
 Unions have played an important role in all states. Union contracts
 called for comparable worth studies at an early stage in Minnesota
 and New York. Union representatives were appointed to oversight
 committees in every state except New York. Collective bargaining
 negotiations either determined the size of the compromise or else
 10 It should be emphasized that the goal of comparable worth is to raise the relative
 pay of female jobs, and, in principle, this may be done without raising the total payroll
 cost to the state provided that (a) pay is cut in a sufficient number of male-dominated
 jobs to offset the increases and (b) these jobs remain at or above competitive private-
 sector rates after the cuts. The latter may be possible given Smith's (1977) analysis. She
 concluded that federal workers were paid well above, state workers somewhat above,
 and local-government workers slightly above private-sector workers. An increase in
 total payroll cost need arise only because of political opposition to pay cuts.
 " This discussion relies heavily on telephone interviews with and documentation
 supplied by individuals who play a key role in their state's comparable worth process.
 We surveyed the states of Connecticut, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York,
 Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin most intensively since they have the most experi-
 ence with comparable worth. In addition, Massachusetts has followed a similar pattern,
 even though its pay plan has taken market wages into account. See the individual state
 publications listed in the references.
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 facilitated it by setting aside money in Connecticut, New York, and
 Oregon. Unions were consulted so that implementation would coin-
 cide with new contracts in Minnesota. In Washington, a legal suit
 brought by the unions was dropped only after (noncontract) negotia-
 tions with the unions induced the state to implement its comparable
 worth plan. In Michigan, a union-filed suit charging the state with sex
 discrimination is now under appeal but appears to have played an
 important role in motivating study and some initial pay adjustments.
 Comparable worth has not led to a reduction in pay grade or pay
 rate in any state except in New York and Washington. In those two
 states, only a very small number of jobs have had cuts in grade, with
 assurances to incumbents that they will not be cut at all (in New York)
 or not cut for 6 months (in Washington). Very few employees appear
 to be affected adversely.
 All state personnel departments have played an important role in
 doing the job analysis and setting up the new pay plan. Typically the
 consultant plays only an advisory role after completing an initial
 study. In all states, factor ratings were based, in part, on question-
 naires filled out by incumbents and, in part, on committees of super-
 visors and professionals, especially from the personnel departments.
 Union representatives were involved in some cases. All states also
 have provided that appeals of job evaluations may be made, although
 typically the appeals go back to the same personnel analysts who made
 the initial decisions.
 While each state has its own unique history and political features,
 the patterns of participation by the major actors (unions, consultants,
 personnel specialists, legislators, and supervisors) are sufficiently sim-
 ilar to allow the conjecture that our major conclusions apply in other
 states. That is, we expect that women have gained less than originally
 proposed as other groups such as unions, supervisors, and profes-
 sionals protect their interests and capture parts of the gains for them-
 selves. At a minimum, this study has given a unique perspective on
 how political and economic forces affect the evolution of public policy
 both in general and in the context of comparable worth.
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